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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
are given on non-fair-traded items redeemable with those that are fair-traded.
It does not seem tenable that the last-mentioned situation could be considered
within the purview of the statute. If discounts are given on merchandise which
is not fair-traded, and that is the only point at which a price reduction is
effected, the discount will have been completed and the transaction consum-
mated before fair-traded merchandise enters the picture, regardless of what
is thereafter done with receipts evidencing the transaction.
Mary K. Davey
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS - "THREAT" TO
PUBLIC ORDER HELD SUPERIOR TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Feiner, a Syracuse University student, speaking through a loud speaker
system from a box located near a street intersection in Syracuse, New York,
addressed a mixed crowd of whites and Negroes urging attendance at a speech
by 0. John Rogge that night in the Syracuse Hotel. In the course of his speech,
he made derogatory remarks about the President, other public officials and the
American Legion, and also indicated that Negroes did not have equal rights.
It was found by the trial judge that he then called upon them to rise up in
arms. This statement, although emphasized by the majority of the Supreme
Court, was disputed by other witnesses who swore that petitioner's statement
was that his listeners "could rise up and fight for their rights by going arm in
arm to the Hotel Syracuse, black and white alike .. ." In any event, one man
threatened that if the police "don't get that son of a bitch off, I will go over
and get him myself." Feiner was first asked, then told, finally commanded to
step down. All the time, he continued to urge attendance at the Rogge meeting.
He was arrested and charged with violation of § 722 of the New York Penal
Law-disorderly conduct. His conviction was upheld in the United States
Supreme Court by five of the justices in an opinion by Mr. Chief justice Vinson
on the ground that a clear danger of disorder.was threatened and hence the
preservation of peace and order on the streets was superior to defendant's
right of free speech. Mr. justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion.
Mr. justice Black in his dissent took direct issue with this view, contending that
the police officer should have protected "petitioner's right to talk, even to the
extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere." It was Black's con-
tention that the defendant had been sentenced for the expression of unpopular
views. justices Douglas and Minton concurred in a dissent on the ground that
the record showed merely an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one
man to interfere with the speaker. Feiner v. New York, - U. S. -, 71
S. Ct. 303 (1951).
There have been only a few cases wherein the social interests of public
order and freedom of speech have clashed. Outstanding have been Cantwell
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v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U. S. 568 (1941). On their facts these cases did not require exposition of the
possible inconsistencies of the two interests. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1 (1949) brought the problem into sharper focus but, as Professor Chafee
points out in Free Speech in the United States at p. 525, "Indoor agitation is
usually less restricted, because it does not interfere with the general use of
public areas." The Feiner incident occurred at a public intersection. It was
not illegal* for Feiner to speak" there. In fact, it was a customary spot from
which soap box orators were prone to deliver addresses. Nor was it illegal for
Feiner to use a loud speaker system. Thus the Supreme Court was presented
with an excellent example of the conflict between the two interests. In any
event, it should not be considered as relevant that the sentiments expressed (by
Feiner) were popular or unpopular.
The much belabored standard used in free speech cases is the clear and
present danger test, formulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47
(1919). Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1924) may have:determined that
the Schenck doctrine is not applicable in situations where the legislative
body has, by statute, determined that utterances of a certain kind involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished. The question presents
itself whether the statute in the Feiner case is of the Gitlow character. The
Gitlow statute did not specifically mention precise words which were to be
condemned, but did give the courts a guide for deducing which words were to
be proscribed. Feiner was charged with violating S 722(2) of the New York
Penal Law: Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
whereby a breach of the peace-may be occasioned, commits any of the follow-
ing acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct
.. 2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct or
be offensive to others." This subdivision's vagueness is readily apparent, and
the courts recognize the defect by advising that its application should be
limited. People v. Schroedel, 147 Misc. 296, 263 N. Y. Supp. 658 (Sup. Ct.
1933). Here the conviction of Feiner rests solely on his verbal utterances and
their tendency to precipitate a public disturbance. In other words, the statute
is determined to be of the Gitlow variety, impliedly condemning language
which would "annoy, disurb, interfere with, obstruct or be offensive to others."
The flinal determination as to which language is to be condemned, however,
does not rest on legal principles. At this point, judges and juries must draw
upon their own convictions and prejudices in order to determine the social
worth of the language in question. Thus we are confronted with the anomaly
of both majority and dissent drawing upon different passages from the same
case, Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, to rationalize on the one hand that the
speaker should be convicted, on the other hand that he should be protected.
The Feiner case was termed an opportunity for the Court "to completely
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review the formula for restricting freedom of speech, by fixing a standard to
determine when a danger is clear, when it is present and what degree of evil
shall be deemed sufficient to justify abridgement of free speech." See 2 SYRA-
cusE L. REV. 171,.173 (1950). This was at best an ingenuou3 suggestion. The
area of free speech defies formulae. As "damned racketeer" and "damned
Fascist" are considered "fighting words" in Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315
U. S. 568 (1941), so now are the words, "rise up in arms," uttered by a Young
Progressive to an audience of mixed sympathies. The courts will always
attempt to solve free speech cases within the time honored framework of case
and controversy, and will wisely avoid going any further. But it now can be
seen that the Court has opened a Pandora's box. On the one hand, Terminiello
can rant and rave although cordons of police are needed to keep off a riotous
mob of 2,300 people, but Feiner, addressing 70 somewhat restless people, is
silenced because one man threatens to assault him. The New York statute,
aside from the question of its vagueness, which must cast a shadow upon its
constitutionality, obviously embodies a threat to freedom of speech. It is
hardly an argument that three New York courts cannot be wrong, or that judges
sitting in Albany can better understand conditions in Syracuse than judges sit-
ting in Washington. The Feiner case is simply an unfortunate holding. It
mirrors the post-war reaction to thoughts or ideas which in any manner can be
connected with unpopular politics. The application of the Gitlow doctrine to
such vaguely drawn statutes may now be an effective weapon in the hands of
local police officials to silence the expression of opinions hostile to the majority
view in the particular community.
Edward S. Spector
NEGLIGENCE - DOCTRINE OF MACPHERSON v. BUICK -
LIABILITY OF REMOTE SUPPLIER
Defendant, who owned and made a business of supplying cranes, rented
one of them to another supplier, also a defendant, who kept it for two days
and then re-rented the crane to the plaintiff's employer for use in its shipyard.
Thirteen months later, a chain on the crane gave way, injuring the plaintiff
how was working nearby. Expert testimony indicated that a fracture had ex-
isted in a link of the chain for at least two years and had at all times been dis-
coverable by "visual inspection." The owner of the more than ten-year-old
crane had agreed to repair it during the rental period. Held (5-2) : the owner
of the crane as well as the intermediate supplier can be held liable under the
principle of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050
(1916). The owner is not relieved of liability merely because the plaintiff's
employer had an equal opportunity to discover the defect and would also be
within "the compass of the MacPherson doctrine." LaRocca v. Farrington, 301
N.Y. 247, 93 N.E. 2d 829 (1950).
